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1 Introduction
The study of networks is one of the most dynamic fields of research in economics today.
Research in networks is regularly published in the top journals of the profession. The best
university presses bring out research monographs on networks written by economists. Re-
searchers in networks win prizes and are awarded prestigious grants from research funding
bodies. Some of the best graduate students in economics choose to work on networks. Gov-
ernments, non-governmental organizations and private companies all express an interest in
the findings of the networks research community.
When the editors of this handbook invited me to write a perspective piece, I felt that it
was a good moment to pause, stand back and take stock.
In this paper, I will argue that at the start of the 1990’s, the introduction of networks in
economics marked a major break with existing practice. Today in 2014, half way through the
third decade of its life, the study of networks has come of age. It is now ‘normal science’ in
the sense of Kuhn (1962).
I start by drawing out the ways in which networks constitute a radical departure from
standard models in economics, as seen in the 1980’s. This will be illustrated with a case
study: the research on social learning, before and after the introduction of networks. The
case study will draw attention to a major methodological innovation: locating individuals
within a general framework of social connections. The analysis yields a number of insights
that relate social structure to individual behavior, learning dynamics, diffusion and welfare.
The second step in my argument shows how initial breakthroughs lead to the investigation
of major new questions. The crucial role of social structure motivated a study of the origins
of networks: where do they come from and what do they look like? This is a question that
was not viewed as especially important or interesting prior to the research on social learning.
I present a case study on the theory of network formation to sketch its key ingredients and its
main insights. A distinctive feature of the research on network formation is a very wide range
of applications. I illustrate the scope of the theory of network formation by showing that it
provides an elegant resolution to two long standing puzzles in the social sciences: one, racial
homophily patterns in friendship, and two, the law of the few in social communication.
I then argue that as the research on behavior in fixed networks and on network formation
has matured it has taken on progressively more ambitious themes. This sets the stage for a
discussion of the nature of research in networks today. I will argue that this work now encom-
passes the classical notions of preferences, individual choice, strategic behavior, competition
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and prices. As a result, networks are now becoming central to improving our understanding
of macro economic volatility and cycles, patterns of international trade, contagion and risk in
financial and social systems, resilience of infrastructure and supply chains, economic develop-
ment, unemployment and inequality, and a host of other important phenomena. The present
handbook offers a panoramic view of the tremendous vitality of this research.
By way of conclusion, I discuss some tensions between traditional models in economics
and models in networks and how these tensions shape current research practice.
2 Networks in economics: a significant departure
This section develops the first step in the argument. I show that networks mark a radical
departure and go beyond the traditional model in economics, as practiced in the late 1980’s.
The theoretical framework of economics was then organized around concepts for the study of
interaction in small groups (game theory) and interaction among large groups (competitive
markets and general equilibrium). A number of phenomena appear to arise in between these
two extremes. By way of illustration and for concreteness, I take up and discuss the case of
learning and diffusion. The received models in the 1980’s appeared to be inadequate both from
the viewpoint of introspection and also failed to account for the empirical patterns. This led to
the first attempts at modeling decision making by individuals embedded in a social network.
I sketch the main ingredients of these first set of models and then show how they depart from
received models. I discuss the main insights and relate them to subsequent developments in
the field.
The diffusion of new ideas, opinions, products and technologies is key to understanding
social change, growth and economic development. Traditionally, economists have focused on
a combination of individual heterogeneity and unknown profitability to explain patterns in
diffusion; a prominent early contribution is Grilliches (1957).1 Through the 1970’s and 1980’s
the study of information imperfections and asymmetries occupied centre stage in economics.
As information has economic value, it was natural to ask if starting from incomplete or
imperfect information, individuals would ‘acquire’ information and ‘learn’ the ‘optimal’ action.
In an early paper, Rothschild (1974) showed that a patient and dynamic optimizing agent will
stop learning and hence will get locked into a sub-optimal action, with positive probability.
This observation was followed by a large and technically sophisticated literature on single
1For a brief summary of the state of the literature in the 1980’s, see Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985).
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agent learning that continued through the 1980’s and well into the 1990’s. Alongside this work,
there emerged a parallel line of work on multi-agent learning: do individuals learn rational
expectations and do individuals learn to play Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998;
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)?
The research focused on the single individual or on groups where interaction was uniform
and homogenous. However, the early work of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948), Katz
and Lazersfeld (1955), Coleman (1966), Granovetter (1973, 1974) and Ryan and Gross (1943)
in sociology, Hagerstrand (1967) in economic geography, and Rogers (1983) in communications,
points to a world that lies somewhere in between these two extremes: individuals, be they
farmers or consumers or doctors, typically interact with only a small subset of the group.
These small subsets – the neighborhoods – are stable and overlap in rich and complicated ways
with the neighborhoods of others. The implicit argument in Coleman (1966) and Hagerstand
(1968) is that these connections are the conduit through which information and influence flow
and this shapes the diffusion of new ideas and practices.
The analysis of many actors located within complex networks strains the plausibility of
delicate chains of strategic reasoning which are typical in game theory. Similarly, the ‘local’
interaction in social networks makes anonymous competitive equilibrium analysis implausible.
This tension between the small and the large is fundamental to understanding behavior and
it posed a challenge to the theory of the 1980’s and motivated a major advance: a framework
with multiple agents, making repeated choices and embodied in a stable social network. Early
papers in this tradition include Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993).
I focus on Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001) as it presents a framework that combines a general
model of networks with individual choice and learning dynamics. The key innovation is
embedding rational individuals in a (directed) network. Individuals do not know the true
value of different actions. So they experiment individually, use their own past experience,
but they also use the experience of their friends and neighbors to guide their decision making.
Moreover, their neighbors in turn use the experience of their friends, and so forth. In this way,
information flows across the connections of a network. The interest is in understanding how
the social structure shapes individual choice, belief dynamics and the diffusion of actions.2
Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001) develop a number of general results. Their first result draws
out an important implication of network connections: if two individuals are directly or indi-
rectly linked then, in the long run, they will learn from each other and make similar decisions
2For a survey of other early attempts to embed individual choice within social structure, see Kirman and
Zimmerman (2001).
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and earn the same amount. Thus local learning ensures that all agents in a connected society
obtain the same utility, in the long run. Second, they show that highly connected ‘hub’ players
can hinder learning and the diffusion of desirable practices. Thus societies with influential
‘hub’ nodes may get locked into inferior practices. Third, they develop sufficient conditions
on social structure – a combination of connectedness and local autonomy (that allows space
and time for individual experimentation) – that guarantee convergence to the optimal action.
Fourth, the simulations of the model generate patterns of diffusion through local spread that
are consistent with observed empirical patterns.
Furthermore, the methodological innovations in the framework are worth noting. These
papers introduced a number of concepts from graph theory – directed graphs, connectedness,
inequalities in connectivity (hubs and spokes), and the combination of node heterogeneity and
network structure. Second they located incomplete information, individual beliefs revision and
dynamics of choice within a directed graph. This combination of individual choice and graphs
is central to subsequent work on networks in economics.
These papers mark a radical departure with the traditional model in economics, as prac-
ticed in the 1980’s. At that time, as pointed out above, economists focused their efforts at
understanding single agent learning or public learning. The work in the early 1990’s intro-
duced graphs – with their attendant concepts. This permits the study of large social groups
with overlapping neighborhoods. It goes beyond the established models for small groups as
well as those that dealt with large groups. These early papers on social learning also fore-
shadow some of the tensions in the literature that shape current research practice. I briefly
turn to this tension now.
The goal of the papers was to understand how Bayesian/fully rational individuals learn
in a social network. The complications involved in making inferences about what neighbors
observe and learn obliged the authors to make the assumption that an individual ignores
the information about actions and experience of neighbors of neighbors possibly contained in
the choice of action of the neighbor. This simplifying assumption reflects a tension that is a
recurring theme in the research in networks. The tension arises from problems of tractability:
models with fully rational agents and general network structures are difficult to analyze,
especially in terms of deriving a clear relation between the network structure and individual
behavior. It is also difficult to incorporate heterogeneity in a tractable way within a network
model with fully rational agents.
As interest in social networks has grown, interest has moved to the study of a tighter
characterization of how social networks shape learning. These questions pose difficult technical
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challenges and held up progress for a number of years; it is only now, in the last five years
or so, that there has been a revival of interest in learning and diffusion in social networks.
This new research has proceeded broadly along two lines: one strand of work has simplified
the individual decision making ingredient of the model and focused attention on rich social
networks and individual heterogeneities. The other strand maintains (and generalizes) the
assumptions on individual beliefs and decision making but works within a special class of
networks.
The potential of the first line of attack is well reflected in the papers that build on the
DeGroot model (1974) of opinions and consensus; see DeMarzo, Vyanos and Zweibel (2003),
Golub and Jackson (2010, 2012). In their recent work, Golub and Jackson (2010, 2012)
provide a number of important results on this subject. In their 2010 paper, building on the
work of DeMarzo, Vyanos and Zweibel (2003), they show that vanishing social influence is
both necessary as well as sufficient in a context of naive learning to guarantee that complete
learning obtains in a large society. This result nicely complements the analysis of incomplete
learning in the Bala and Goyal (1998) framework, and it illustrates the value of moving to a
simpler, reduced form, model of beliefs and choice. In their 2012 paper, Golub and Jackson
study how the speed of learning in a society depends on homophily: the tendency of agents to
associate disproportionately with those having similar traits. When agents’ beliefs or behaviors
are developed by averaging what they see among their neighbors, convergence to a consensus
is slowed by the presence of homophily, but is not influenced by network density. The key
contribution is a new measure of homophily based on the relative frequencies of interactions
among different groups. These findings are very important in view of the presence of homophily
in social relations (reported below in the network formation section).
The second strand of the literature maintains the assumption of Bayesian/rational decision
makers: as the belief dynamics are generally non-linear, there are technical hurdles to a full
understanding of the role of social networks in shaping learning and rates of convergence.
This challenge has motivated an interesting program of research; recent contributions include
Acemoglu et al (2011), Jhadbabaie, Molavi, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2013), Mossel, Sly and Tamuz
(2015) and Mueller-Frank (2013), and others.
The work of Acemoglu et al (2011) reflects the potential in this line of work. This paper
builds on the pioneering work of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer (1993) and
combines it with the theory of random graphs. There is a single sequence of privately informed
individuals who take one action each. Before making his choice an individual gets to observe
the actions of all the people who have made a choice earlier. The actions of his predecessors
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potentially reveal their private information. An individual can therefore use the information
revealed via the actions of others along with his own private information to make decisions.
The principal question is: do individuals eventually learn and choose the optimal action?
In their work, Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) showed that
there was a possibility of herding on the inefficient action. In their model all individuals observe
everyone who has gone before them, before making a choice. Acemoglu et al (2011) relax this
assumption. They propose that an individual draws a sample from the past individuals.
The focus is on properties of the properties of sample. They show that learning is complete
and the optimal action is chosen with probability 1 if the sample is ‘expanding’: expanding
observations implies that the probability of an agent being observed goes to 0 as we move
across time. This in turn means that there is a bound on the influence an individual can have
in the long run. This is sufficient to ensure that privately generated information is not blocked
out and that agents eventually choose the optimal action, in the long run.
The details of the arguments and the technical methods differ across the three papers
discussed above – Bala and Goyal (1998), Golub and Jackson (2010) and Acemoglu et al.
(2011) – but they point to a similar idea: in an information rich world social learning obtains
when no single individual exercises social influence.
The initial motivation underlying the study of social learning in networks came from the
empirical patterns on spatial and temporal diffusion of ideas, products and technologies. As
the theoretical work has progressed, economists have examined the empirical implications
of networks for learning and diffusion of networks. Important contributions to this line of
work include Conley and Udry (2010) and Banerjee et al (2013). For a survey on the role of
networks in economic development, see Munshi (2014).
Conley and and Udry (2010) investigate the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new
agricultural technology in Ghana. The novelty of their work is a detailed description of each
individual farmer’s information neighborhood. They find evidence that farmers adjust their
inputs to align with those of their information neighbors who were particularly successful in
previous periods. As a check on the interpretation of these social learning effects they also
study input choices for another crop, of known technology: there are no social learning effects
in the latter case.
Banerjee et al. (2013) study the diffusion of micro-finance in Indian villages. They ex-
ogenously vary the ‘injection points’ of information across villages and ask how differences in
network characteristics of the initial seeding nodes affects eventual adoption of micro-finance.
Their main finding is that micro-finance is significantly higher when the injection points have
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higher eigenvector centrality. The authors also estimate a model of information diffusion and
adoption using detailed data on demographic and network variables. These papers mark a
departure from the earlier tradition of empirical work in its explicit treatment of network
architecture. It also implicitly hints at the substantial advances in data availability and com-
puting power. Big data is a broad scale technological change and this empirical work reflects
an important point of contact with economics.
By way of summary, this case study brings out three general points. The first is method-
ological: around the early 1990’s we see the first set of models that incorporate individual
choice and network structure within a common framework. This marks a major advance in
the conceptual framework and it brings the concepts and the insights of graph theory and net-
works into the mainstream of economics. This expansion also points to problems of tractability
that shape future research. The second is the collection of analytical results: the role of so-
cial structure, in particular the role of hubs in shaping learning and creating blockages and
lock-ins. These results motivate a large and flourishing current research programme on how
structure shapes behavior; a prominent instance of this is the large body of work on games on
networks.3 The third point is the move toward the study of large data sets on networks and of
dynamics of behavior on these networks. This hints to the impact of big data on research in
economics; we will return to this point again in subsequent sections. Finally, the case study
highlights how an economic approach combines with networks to deliver insights in areas that
were previously the reserve of sociologists and geographers.4
3 The origins of networks
The finding that the social structure has large effects on individual behavior and well-being
motivates an examination of the structure of social networks and very quickly leads to a study
of their origins. This section develops the second part of the argument – the emergence of
entirely new research questions – and presents a case study of the theory of network formation.
At the very outset, it is worth emphasizing the novelty of the approach: the traditional
approach in sociology and related social sciences focuses on the effects of social structure on
3For early work in this field, see Goyal and Moraga (2001), Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) and Ballester,
Calvo-Armenogol and Zenou (2006); for surveys of this work see Goyal (2007) and Jackson and Zenou (2014).
4One of the distinctive aspects of research on networks in economics is that it is concurrent with a very
broad interest in networks across the social and the information sciences. For a discussion of the distinctiveness
of the economic approach and the many points of contact and overlap between the different disciplines, see
Goyal (2007).
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behavior (Granovetter (1985), Smelser and Swedberg (2005)). The economic approach to
network formation locates the origins of networks in individual choice. It therefore puts the
traditional approach firmly on its head!
The second and equally interesting point to note is that a ‘framework’, once in place,
begins to formulate entirely new questions, questions which would have appeared meaningless
or without any great interest prior to its emergence. The new questions on network formation
deepen the original investigations – on the effects of networks on individual behavior and
learning dynamics – and they expand and reshape the research programme in a profound way.
The key innovation is the idea that the social (and economic) structure itself is created
through purposeful individual activity. This is a powerful idea and it has had far reaching
effects: it has deepened our understanding of classical questions in economics and the other
social sciences and it has motivated altogether new lines of enquiry.
The beginnings of the theory of network formation can be traced to the work of Boorman
(1975), Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Myerson (1991). The general framework and a
systematic theory of network formation was first presented in Bala and Goyal (2000) and
in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The two papers present complementary approaches to the
process of network formation. Over the past two decades, this has been a very active field of
research; one of its great successes has been a wide and expanding range of applications. As
the applications have progressed, empirical analysis and experimental investigations have also
gathered momentum.
In this section I briefly sketch the building blocks and some of the main insights of the
theory of network formation. I then illustrate the scope of the theory through a discussion of
two classical questions in the social sciences.
I first take up the approach of unilateral link formation. This approach was introduced
in Goyal (1993) and systematically studied in Bala and Goyal (2000). Consider a collection
of individuals, each of whom can form a link with any subset of the remaining players. Link
formation is unilateral: an individual can decide to form a link with another individual by
paying for the link. It takes time and effort to sustain a link. A link with another individ-
ual allows access, in part and in due course, to the benefits available to the latter via his
own links. Thus individual links generate externalities whose value depends on the level of
decay/delay associated with indirect links. As links are created on an individual basis, the
network formation process can be analyzed as a noncooperative game. The paper allows for
general payoffs — increasing in number of people accessed and declining in number of links
formed.
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There are interesting practical examples of this type of link formation – hyper-links across
web-pages, citations, ‘following’ relations on Twitter, and gifts. But the principal appeal of
this model is its simplicity. This simplicity allows for a systematic study a number of central
questions concerning social and economic networks.
Bala and Goyal (2000) provide a characterization of the architecture of equilibrium net-
works. The equilibrium networks have simple architectures: star (hub-spoke) networks and
the cycle are salient. This prediction of great heterogeneity in connections and the presence
of highly connected ‘hub’ nodes is an important theoretical contribution. In the star network,
the central hub node will generally earn much larger payoffs as compared to the peripheral
nodes. Thus, the theory provides a foundation for the idea that social structures may sustain
great inequality. This part of the theory ties in closely and gains significance in the context of
the earlier discussion on patterns of social learning in networks with highly connected hubs.
Bala and Goyal (2000) also introduce the study of dynamics of linking: at every point,
individuals may revise their current links. Their main insight is that individual efforts to access
benefits offered by others lead, rapidly, to the emergence of an equilibrium social network,
under a variety of circumstances. This provides a foundation to the idea that certain social
structures – including those that are very unequal – may be dynamically stable.
One virtue of the unilateral link formation model is that it allows us to combine graphs
and the tools of non-cooperative game theory. This approach has subsequently been used in
the study of a variety of economic problems. For a survey of this work, see Bloch and Dutta
(2012) and Goyal (2007).
I turn next to two-sided or bilateral link formation. This approach was introduced
and developed in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A link between two players requires the
approval of both the players involved. This is the natural way to think about link formation
in a number of social and economic contexts such as the formation of friendship ties, co-
authorship, collaborations between firms, trading links between buyers and sellers, and free
trade agreements between nations.
The simplest way to think of two sided link formation is to imagine an announcement
game along the lines of the game sketched by Myerson (1991). Each player announces a set of
intended links. A link between two individuals A and B is formed if both A and B announce
an intention to create a link. In a context where links are two sided there are elements of
“cooperation” involved in the formation of a link, and so solving such games calls for new
concepts.
It is useful to begin the discussion with the familiar notion of Nash equilibrium as this
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will illustrate some of the conceptual issues that arise in the study of network formation with
two-sided links. If every player announces that she wants to form no links then a best response
is to announce no links. In other words, the ‘empty’ network is a Nash equilibrium for any
network formation game. To overcome this type of coordination failure, Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) propose the concept of pair-wise stable networks.
A network is said to be pairwise stable if no individual wishes to delete a link and if no
two unlinked individuals wish to form a link: Pairwise stability looks at the attractiveness of
links in a network g, one at a time. Formally, every link present in a stable network must be
profitable for the players involved in the link. For every link not present in the network it
must be the case that if one player strictly gains from the link then the other player must be
strictly worse off.
The second important contribution of the Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) paper was the
result on a conflict between stability and efficiency. This highlights the pervasive externalities
in linking activity and is a recurring theme in the subsequent research in this area.
The great attraction of pairwise stability is its simplicity. For any network it is relatively
easy to check whether the two conditions are satisfied. The theoretical properties of this
solution concept have been developed systematically and the solution concept has been widely
applied; for a survey of this work, see Bloch and Dutta (2012) and Jackson (2008).
The network formation framework has motivated a vibrant theoretical, empirical and ex-
perimental literature. For book length overviews, see Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008). For
a recent overview on network formation models and applications, see the handbook on social
economics edited by Bisin, Benhabib and Jackson (2012).
One of the great successes of this research has been an extensive set of economic appli-
cations. Examples of this work include formation of research collaboration networks (Goyal
and Joshi, 2003), core and periphery in networks (Hojman and Szeidl, 2008), structural holes
in trading networks (Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007), networks and coordination (Goyal and
Vega-Redondo, 2005; Jackson and Watts, 2002), co-author networks (Jackson and Wolin-
sky, 1996), collusion networks (Belleflamme and Bloch, 2004), information networks (Gale-
otti and Goyal, 2010), peer networks (Cabrales, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou, 2011), labor
market networks (Calvo-Armengol, 2004; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004), buyer-seller
networks (Kranton and Minehart, 2001), risk-sharing networks (Ambrus, Mobius and Szeidl,
2014; Ambrus, Chandrashekhar and Elliott (2014), Bloch, Genicot and Ray, 2008; Bramoulle
and Kranton, 2007), financial networks (Babus, 2008; Cabrales, Gottardi and Vega-Redondo,
2013; Farboodi, 2014), cyberattack and network design (Goyal and Vigier, 2014; Acemoglu,
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Malekian and Ozdaglar, 2014) and free-trade agreement networks (Goyal and Joshi, 2006;
Furasawa and Konishi (2007)).
I now discuss two applications of this approach that highlight its ability to address impor-
tant open questions in the social sciences.
Homophily and Social Structure: An important strand of the research examines the effect
of heterogeneity on social networks. This work asks how differences in costs and benefits of
linking affect linking behavior and shape the overall social network. Early work in this field
extended the basic network formation model and looked for equilibrium or pairwise stable
networks (for an overview, see Goyal, 2007). In more recent years, interest has shifted to
dynamic models of linking and the key element explored is homophily.
It is generally agreed that human relations exhibit homophily : individuals prefer to be
friends with others like themselves. There is a long and distinguished literature on patterns
of homophily in friendships. For an influential early discussion, see Lazarsfeld and Merton
(1954); for a recent survey, see McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001).
Three empirical regularities have been highlighted in this literature. One, larger groups
tend to form more same-type ties and fewer other-type ties than small groups. Two, that
larger groups form more ties per capita. Three, all groups exhibit an inbreeding bias: there
are more friendships within a group relative to fraction in population (with the greatest bias
being in middle-sized groups).
Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2009) develop a model of friendship formation that helps to
explain these homophily patterns. Individuals have types and access type-dependent benefits
from friendships. The innovation here is the model of friendships: individuals form friendships
taking into account their preferences and the relative proportions of different types in the
population. The authors examine the properties of a steady-state equilibrium of a matching
process of friendship formation. They show that the three empirical regularities arise as
properties of the steady state social relations if preferences exhibit biases.
The study of homophily and its consequences for inequality and segregation is a very active
field of research currently; see e.g., Bramoulle et al. (2014).
The Law of the Few: The classical early work of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948)
and Katz and Lazersfeld (1955) investigated the impact of personal contacts and mass media
on voting and consumer choice with regard to product brands, films, and fashion changes.
They found that personal contacts play a dominant role in disseminating information which
in turn shapes individuals decisions. In particular, they identified 20 percent of their sample of
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4,000 individuals as the primary source of information for the rest. Moreover, there exist only
minor differences between the observable characteristics of the influencers and the others. Re-
cent empirical work on virtual social communities reveals a similar pattern of communication.
How do we account for this pattern of specialization?
Galeotti and Goyal (2010) propose a model to study this question. This model combines
the Bala and Goyal (2000) model of network formation with a model of local public goods
developed by Bramoulle and Kranton (2007). They study a setting in which individuals
choose to personally acquire information and to form connections with others to access the
information these contacts acquire. Their main finding is that every (strict) equilibrium of the
game exhibits the law of the few. The network has a core-periphery architecture; the players
in the core acquire information personally, while the peripheral players acquire no information
personally but form links and get all their information from the core players. The core group
is small relative to number of individuals. They also show that a small heterogeneity in costs
of acquiring information has strong effects: the individuals who have slightly lower costs of
acquiring information constitute the core and acquire all the information. Thus strategic
forces amplify small initial differences to create large differences in behavior and location in
social structure.
A number of subsequent papers have explored models that combine behavior and formation
of structure; see e.g., Baetz (2014) and Hiller (2013).
The theoretical research on network formation has been accompanied by a growing sophis-
tication in empirical investigations on the structure and dynamics of networks. It is useful
to view this work as dealing with small and large networks. Small networks may involve
oligopolistic firms or countries (and range from a few nodes to a hundred nodes), while large
networks involve scientists, individual consumers, or web pages (and may contain from hun-
dreds of thousands to millions of nodes). The theoretical models in economics provide a good
account for the stylized features of small and medium sized networks but these models do not
account well for the complexities of large and massive networks. As computational power has
grown the interest and ability to map very large networks has also grown. This gap between
the successful theoretical game theoretic models and the properties of large empirical networks
now presents a major challenge to the received theory.
Empirical contexts appear to be rich in heterogeneity and in dynamics: this suggests that
individuals will have limited information on the identity of nodes and on the structure of
the network. An early response to this complexity is a paper by Jackson and Rogers (2007).
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They present a dynamic model of linking where newly born nodes use a combination of random
linking and network based linking to form new networks. The linking follows plausible rules
of thumb and individuals do not take into account the effects of their actions or the evolution
of the network in making their choices. Nevertheless, the dynamics of linking generate a
concrete set of predictions on network structure as a function of key parameters, such as the
ratio of random versus network based linking. The model provides us with a mechanism that
shapes network evolution. In this sense it is close to the models in physics and mathematics.
However, as the micro structure is kept minimal – preferences, information and choice is not
modeled explicitly – it is unclear how one can make use of the model for normative or for
policy experimentation. There is thus a tension between the standard approach in economics
and the need to account for large scale empirical networks.5
Empirical work also suggests that a relation between two individuals have different facets:
a link may typically performs a variety of functions and that they are interrelated. Existing
theoretical work on the other hand assumes that a network performs a single function and
studies this role in isolation. Moving from single role networks to multiplex networks is an
important challenge for future work.
To summarize, the theory of network formation provides an account for how individual
action shapes social and economic structure. In founding a theory of social structure upon
individual choice, it presents a major departure from earlier traditions in sociology and the
other social sciences. The theory combines elements of the theory of games with probability
theory and graph theory. It offers insights into a variety of real world phenomena, especially
in the context of small and medium size networks. There, however, remains a tension between
the stark predictions of the successful models of network formation and the complex properties
of large and evolving networks.
4 The route to normal science: prices, competition and
networks
At the start and through the 1990’s, research on networks focused on behavior in given
networks and on the theory of network formation. I would say that this research proceeded at
5Galeotti et al (2010) present one resolution to this tension. They assume that individuals have limited and
local information of the complex network in which they are embedded. This leads them to develop a model of
incomplete private information and examine how variations in the strategic structure of the game, the depth
of network knowledge and the underlying network structure jointly shape behavior.
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a ‘pure’ and ‘general’ level with relatively little connection to applications. But, by the end of
the decade, economists working in networks began to address specific economic questions and,
as they did so, they began to develop models that included competition, prices and markets.
Indeed, the last decade has seen the emergence of a very rich and thriving research programme
in which these standard economic concepts play a central role. In this respect, there is a close
analogy with the spread of game theory during the 1980’s and 1990’s in one applied field after
another in economics. We are beginning to see a similar trend with networks.
The aim of this section is to illustrate this development through a discussion of a few
notable examples. I find it useful to distinguish between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ networks;
while this distinction is a little artificial in some applications, it is helpful in organizing the
discussion.
4.1 Economic Networks and Markets
In the classical Walrasian model it is assumed that individuals are anonymous, that they can
all trade with each other and that this trade takes place at a common price. In real world
markets buyers and sellers develop durable relations of exchange, these relations are personal
and that there are definite limitations on who can trade with whom. Moreover, terms of trade
differ across traders and that they depend on the network structure of relations; for empirical
evidence see e.g., Uzzi (1993), Kirman and Vignes (1991), among others. These findings lead
us to view markets as networks. We are then led to ask what are the incentives of buyers and
sellers to form durable relations?
I start with a discussion of the market as a network. Kranton and Minehart (2001)
consider a model with two stages. In stage 1, buyers unilaterally choose to form links with
sellers. These links enable buyers to procure goods or inputs. Buyers trade-off expected gains
from trade against costs of link formation.6 In stage 2, the valuations of buyers are realized;
they then engage in trade with sellers restricted by the network structure defined in the first
stage. The trading in stage 2 takes place through a centralized auction where at each price
efficient matches are determined.
The paper establishes two major results: networks arise as a mechanism to pool uncertainty
in demand and trade it off with the costs of establishing bilateral ties. The analysis also
reveals, somewhat surprisingly, that an efficient allocation mechanism (ex-post competitive
6For a related strand of the literature on buyer-seller networks with a different modeling approach – based
on heuristic learning rules and random linking decisions – see Weisbuch, Kirman and Herreiner (2000).
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environment) is sufficient to align the buyers’ incentives to form ties with the social incentives.
For a systematic recent study of inefficiencies in networked markets, see Elliott (2014).
The Kranton-Minehart (2010) model pertains to direct buyer-seller ties: the modern econ-
omy is characterized by extensive and complicated array of supply chains, that span industries
and countries. A more recent strand of the literature studies pricing, contracting and com-
petition in these supply chains (Choi, Galeotti and Goyal (2014), Gale and Kariv (2009),
Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007), Manea (2013), and Kotowoski and Leister (2012), and Nava
(2014)). This work builds on the earlier tradition of games on networks. The study of supply
chains is now also a major focus of study in macroeconomics: the interest here is in under-
standing how the network structure of production connections amplifies shocks and thereby
generates more or less aggregate volatility (Acemoglu et al. (2012), Carvalho (2014)).
I now turn to the other standard model of markets: oligopolistic competition. The
standard model of oligopoly assumes that firms non-cooperatively set prices (or quantities).
Empirical work suggests that collaboration between firms is common. This collaboration
takes a variety of forms, which include creation and sharing of knowledge about markets and
technologies, the setting of market standards and the sharing of facilities (such as distribution
channels or plane capacity). Typically, collaboration ties are bilateral and are embedded
within a broader network of similar ties with other firms. Considerable asymmetries exist
between the level of collaborative activity across firms, with some firms forming several ties
whereas others are poorly linked (Powell 1990; Hagedoorn, 2002; Gulati, 2007). This empirical
evidence motivates the study of the relation between oligopolistic market competition and
collaboration networks.
Goyal and Joshi (2003) present a framework for the study of these issues. The two ingre-
dients are a model of bilateral link formation and the standard textbook model of oligopoly.
The innovation here is a general model of bilateral linking. Prior to competing in the market,
firms can form pair-wise collaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links involve a
commitment of resources and lead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms.
Goyal and Joshi (2003) show that incentives to form links are closely related to market
competition: in a standard homogenous good model if competition is in prices, firms choose
to form no links, while if competition is in quantities, then firms typically form dense but
asymmetric networks of collaboration. Thus collaborations are used by firms to generate
competitive advantage. Moreover, market competition shapes networks and these networks in
turn define the competitiveness of firms in a market. This two-way flow of influence between
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markets and networks is central to understanding economic activity.
Collaboration networks in markets remains an active field of research; recent papers explore
socially optimal networks and the scope of public policy (Koenig et al. (2014), Westbrock
(2010)).
In the applications above, I have considered direct ties between buyers and sellers or
between firms. I now turn to intermediation. The financial sector embodies intermediation
in a pure form – that between the sources and the eventual users of savings. Traditional models
of the banking sector generally pay little attention to the rich patterns of intermediation within
the sector. Following the financial crises of 2008, there has been renewed interest in the role
of interconnections among financial institutions as a source for the transmission and possible
amplification of shocks. Consequently, a number of papers have documented the structure of
the inter-bank lending network, see e.g., Bech and Atalay (2010), Afonso and Lagos (2012),
Van Lelyveld I., and t’ Veld (2012). The broad consensus is that this network has a core-
periphery structure: there is a core of large banks that are densely interconnected, and a large
number of smaller banks at the periphery. There is a net inflow of funds from the peripheral
banks to the core banks. These empirical findings motivate the study of economic mechanisms
underlying the formation of core-periphery financial networks.
In a recent paper, Farboodi (2014) develops a model of the financial sector in which banks
choose to form endogenous intermediation links with each other. There are banks that have
links with depositors and banks that have links with potential investors. A link between
two banks is a durable relationships. Links are unilateral: a link from A to B constitutes
a commitment from A to honor any loan demand from B. A bank has an incentive to form
multiple links and be the intermediary between a source bank and a destination bank as it can
then earn ‘rents’. Farboodi (2014) shows that a core-periphery network endogenously emerges
as an equilibrium outcome. An important result is that the network is inefficient as banks
who lend to investors ‘over-connect’, exposing themselves to excessive counter-party risk, while
(depositor linked) banks who mainly provide funding end up with too few connections. This
creates excessive risk in the system at large.
This paper builds on the early work of Allen and Gale (2000) and Babus (2006) in financial
networks and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) in the theory of network formation. It is also
part of the recent flurry of activity in the area of financial networks: other recent papers
include Allen, Babus and Carletti (2012), Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015),
Cabrales, Gottardi and Vega-Redondo (2012) and Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014).
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4.2 Social Networks and Markets
In this section, I discuss the interaction between social ties between individuals – examples
include friendships, family ties, street neighborhoods, caste, race and religious affiliations –
and markets. As a first approximation, these ties may be taken as given and external to the
specific economic problem being studied.7
I start with a discussion of social networks in product markets. In the standard
product market model a firm chooses prices, advertising strategy and quality taking as given
heterogenous consumer preferences (Tirole (1994)). The role of friends, neighbors, and col-
leagues in shaping consumer choice has been brought out in a number of studies over the years.
In the past, the practical use of such social influences for advertising or pricing was hampered
by the lack of good data on them. The growth of the Internet and the large amounts of data
on online social networking along with the other advances in information technology have
made it considerably easier to gather data on social networks and have led to an explosion in
interest on how firms and governments can harness the power of social networks to promote
social and private goals. Practical interest has centered on questions such as: for which prod-
uct categories are networks important and when are they unimportant; what are the relevant
aspects of networks; how should a firm use social networks to promote its product; how much
should a firm be willing to pay to acquire information about social networks and how should
a firm compete with other firms on social networks.
Galeotti and Goyal (2009) study the optimal strategy of a firm that wishes to reach max-
imum number of consumers located in a social network. The firm chooses whom to target
with advertisements, under the assumption that advertisements travel through connections.
They show that the optimal strategy involves targeting more connected nodes in some cases
and poorly connected nodes in other cases. The use of social networks always leads to higher
sales and greater profits. However, an increase in the level and dispersion of social interaction
can have non-monotonic effects on level of optimal strategy. Finally, they also show that
the returns to investing in market research on social networks are greater in more unequal
networks.
These results are obtained in a setting with one firm, with one step spread of advertisement,
7The effect of social networks on economic life is the subject matter of economic sociology; for an overview
of this work, see Smelser and Swedberg (2005). There are overlaps between the work in sociology and research
on networks in economics and a deeper engagement would be mutually beneficial. But a detailed discussion
of the relations will not be attempted here, as it will take me too far afield. I make some general remarks on
this issue in the appendix.
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and with advertising strategy only. Current research extends and deepens the scope of the
analysis significantly to include multiple firms, dynamics of spreading information, and to
allow for pricing in addition to advertising choices (Fainmesser and Galeotti (2014), Goyal
and Kearns (2012), and Campbell (2013)). The use of social networks for optimal diffusion
of information remains a very active field of research in economics and in other social and
information sciences.
In a related line of work, researchers have explored the use of targeted pricing strategy
in social networks. In the standard network externalities literature pricing was conditional
on the size of aggregate consumer base (Farrell and Saloner (1986), and Katz and Shapiro
(1985)). Network externality often arises through the use of common products or services
in personal interaction. So the value of adopting a product to a consumer would depend on
how many of her neighbors adopt the same product. In other words, the value depends on
adoption patterns in the local neighborhood. This motivates the study of optimal pricing that
is sensitive to the network properties of individuals. In an important paper, Bloch and Querou
(2013) analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where agents care
about consumption of their neighbors. They show that optimal prices are related to consumer
centrality in the social network. This relation depends on the market structure (monopoly vs.
oligopoly). They identify two situations where the monopolist does not discriminate between
nodes in the network: linear monopoly with consumption externalities and local monopolies
with price externalities. Aoyagi (2014) extends this work to allow for more general externalities
and competition among several firms.
I turn next to the role of social networks in financial markets. This is one setting
where the standard market model of anonymous traders and common prices that reveal in-
formation of traders has been very dominant. In recent years this standard view has been the
subject of much attention, both empirically and theoretically. By way of motivation, I start
with some empirical findings. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) show that portfolio managers
place larger bets on firms when they went to school with senior managers or a board member
and perform significantly better on these holdings. Similarly, Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005)
document that US fund managers located in the same city commit to correlated investment
decisions. The authors argue that such correlated choices may be due to peer-to-peer commu-
nication or because fund managers in a given area base their decisions upon common sources
of information. The empirical evidence motivates a more systematic study of the relation
between information social networks and trader behavior and aggregate outcomes on volume
and prices. Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) and Colla and Mele (2010) study asset pricing in
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markets where traders are located in information networks. They study trader behavior on
a fixed network and derive a relation between equilibrium outcomes (on prices and trading
volume) and the network topology.
I turn finally to the role of social networks in labor markets. Workers like jobs that
suit their skills and location preferences, while firms are keen to hire workers who have the
right ability for the job. However, workers do not know which firms have vacancies, and
finding out the right job takes time and effort. Similarly, firms do not know which workers are
looking for a job. Faced with this lack of information, workers look for job advertisements in
newspapers and magazines. They also spread the word among their friends and acquaintances
that they are looking for a job, and indeed there is substantial evidence that they often get
information on job vacancies via their personal connections. A second type of information
problem concerns the ability of workers: a person generally knows more about his own ability
as compared to a potential employer. Indeed, this asymmetry in information leads workers to
invest in signals of their quality (such as educational degrees, certificates and licenses), and
it leads potential employers to ask for references and recommendation letters. Referrals –
references and recommendation letters – are widely used in the process of matching workers
and firms. A letter of reference is only valuable in so far as the employer can trust the writer
of the letter; this suggests that the structure of personal connections is likely to play an
important role in matching workers and firms.
These observations raise the question: how does the pattern of social contacts affect the
flow of information about jobs? The flow of information across persons will influence how
quickly workers are matched with jobs which will in turn shape the level of employment. The
patterns of social connections will also determine who gets information and when; this in
turn may determine who gets a job and who is left unemployed, which will in turn have a
bearing on the distribution of earnings and overall inequality in a society. The study of social
networks in labor markets has a distinguished and long history; for a survey of this work, see
Granovetter (1974) and Goyal (2007). The older work has an empirical orientation. In recent
years, economists have made significant progress in the theoretical analysis of this issue.
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) study a model of information transmission on job
vacancies. Their analysis of this model yields three main insights. The first insight is that the
employment status of individuals in a social network is positively correlated. Empirical work
suggests that there is significant correlation in employment status within social communities or
geographically contiguous city districts. The second insight is that the probability of finding a
job is declining with the duration of unemployment. Duration dependence of unemployment
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has been widely documented. The reason that duration dependence arises in a context of
social information sharing is that a longer spell of unemployment reveals that a person’s
social contacts are less likely to be employed, which in turn makes it less likely that they will
pass on information concerning vacancies. The third insight is that small initial differences
in employment across otherwise identical groups of individuals can have significant effects on
the incentives to drop out of the labor market. However, if individuals drop out of the social
network then this reduces the value to others of remaining in the network. Thus small initial
differences can create a sequence of drop outs, which in turns can have long run effects on
employment prospects of the group.
Montgomery (1991), studies the adverse selection problem in labor markets. The analysis
of this model yields two key insights. The first insight of the analysis is that workers with
more connections will earn a higher wage and that firms who hire through contacts (of their
existing high quality workers) will earn higher profits. The reason for this relation between
connections and wages is simple: more connections implies a higher number of referral wage
offers from firms (on average) and this translates into a higher accepted wage (on average).
The second insight is that an increase in the density of social connections raises the inequality
in wages. This effect is a reflection of the lemons effect: an increase in social ties means that
more high ability workers are hired via referrals, and this lowers the quality of workers who
go into the open market, thereby pushing down their wage, relatively.
In Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2003), prices and competition do not play a role, while
in Montgomery (1991) there is no modeling of network topology. The integration of network
topology with the usual ingredients of pricing and competition remains a challenging open
problem.
5 Closing the circle
The study of networks is one of the most dynamic and exciting fields of research in contem-
porary economics. The research ranges across theory, experiments and empirics. The models
address an increasingly wide and ambitious range of questions using mathematical models and
statistical techniques that in turn draw on a variety of disciplines. In this paper, my aim has
been to locate the innovation that networks bring to economics, to assess the current state of
research and to point to current challenges.
I have argued that research on networks in economics started with theoretical innovation
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in the early 1990’s. At the start, both the research on social learning and the research
on network formation emerged in relative autonomy from applications and empirical work.
When the results came in contact with substantive issues in economics this research gathered
momentum. It generated new questions that built on the research and lent the programme
greater significance. In the last decade the innovations have matured; now they combine with
pre-existing concepts – such as competition, asymmetric information, and prices – to build an
encompassing framework. In the words of Kuhn (1962), research on networks in economics
has acquired the traits of ‘normal’ science.
I have also identified a persistent and growing tension between (much of) the theoretical
research and the empirical findings on behavior and structure of large and complex networks.
This tension should not come as a surprise: traditionally, economists have been successful
at developing concepts for the study of interaction in small closed groups (game theory)
and interaction among large groups (competitive markets and general equilibrium). A social
network typically consists of a large number of individuals and any individual interacts only
with a small subset of them. The analysis of many actors located within complex networks
strains the plausibility of delicate chains of strategic reasoning which are typical in game
theory. Similarly, the ‘local’ interaction in social networks makes anonymous competitive
equilibrium analysis implausible. Thus networks fall between the ‘small’ and the ‘large’. So,
while much has been accomplished, I believe that this tension will continue to offer a fertile
ground for new and exciting research in the years to come.
6 References
1. Acemoglu, D., V. Carvalho, A. Ozdaglar and A.Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), The Network
Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations, Econometrica, 80, 5, 1977-2016.
2. Acemoglu, D., M.A. Dahleh, I. Lobel, A. Ozdaglar (2011), Bayesian Learning in Social
Networks, Review of Economic Studies, 78, 1201-1246.
3. Acemoglu, D., A. Malekian and A. Ozdaglar (2014), Network security and contagion,
mimeo, MIT.
4. Acemoglu, D., A. Ozdaglar and A. Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), Systemic Risk and Stability
in Financial Networks, American Economic Review, 105, 2, 564-608.
21
5. Afonso, G. and R. Lagos (2012), Trade dynamics in the market for federal funds. Federal
Reserve of New York Staff Report.
6. Allen, F., A. Babus, E. Carletti (2012), Asset commonality, debt maturity and systemic
risk, Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 3, 519-534.
7. Ambrus, A., M. Mobius and A. Szeidl (2014) Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Net-
works, American Economic Review, 104, 1, 149-182,
8. Ambrus, A. A. Chandrashekhar and M. Elliott (2014), Social investments, informal risk
sharing and inequality, mimeo, Duke and Caltech.
9. Aoyagi, M., (2014), Bertrand competition under network externalities, Mimeo, Osaka
University.
10. Aumann, R. and R. Myerson (1988), Endogenous formation of links between players and
coalitions: an application to the Shapley Value, in The Shapley Value, A. Roth (ed.),
175-91, Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
11. Babus, A. (2006), The formation of financial networks. mimeo.
12. Baetz, O. (2014), Social Activity and Network Formation, Theoretical Economics, forth-
coming.
13. Bala, V. and S. Goyal (1995), A Theory of Learning with Heterogeneous Agents, Inter-
national Economic Review, 36, 2, 303-323.
14. Bala, V. and S. Goyal (1998), Learning from Neighbours, Review of Economic Studies
65, 595-621.
15. Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2000), A Non-Cooperative Model of Network Formation, Econo-
metrica, 68, 5, 1181-1231.
16. Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2001), Conformism and diversity under social learning, Economic
Theory, 17, 101-120.
17. Ballester, C., Calvo-Armengol, A., and Zenou. Y. (2006), Who’s Who in Networks.
Wanted: The Key Player. Econometrica, 74, 1403-1417.
18. Banerjee, A. (1992), A simple model of herd behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
22
19. Banerjee, A., A. Chandrasekhar, E. Duflo and M.O. Jackson (2013), The Diffusion of
Microfinance, Science Magazine, 341, 61-74.
20. Barabasi, A.L. (2002), Linked. Perseus Books. New York.
21. Bech, M. L. and E. Atalay (2010), The topology of the federal funds market. Physica
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 389, 22, 5223-5246.
22. Belleflamme, P. and F. Bloch (2004), Market sharing agreements and collusive networks,
International Economic Review, 45,2, 387-411.
23. Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshliefer, D., and I. Welch (1992) A theory of fads, fashion,
custom, and cultural change as informational cascades, Journal Political Economy, 100,
9921023.
24. Bisin, A., J. Benhabib and M. Jackson (2012), The Handbook of Social Economics:
Volumes I-II. North Holland. Amsterdam.
25. Bloch, F. and B. Dutta (2012), Formation of Networks and Coalitions, in Social Eco-
nomics, edited by A. Bisin, J. Benhabib and M. Jackson. North Holland. Amsterdam.
26. Bloch, F., G. Genicot and D. Ray (2008), Informal insurance in social networks, Journal
of Economic Theory 143, 1, 2008, 36-58.
27. Bloch, F., and N. Querou (2013), Pricing in social networks, Games and Economic
Behavior, 80, 263-281.
28. Bolloba´s, B. (1998), Modern Graph Theory, Spinger Verlag. Berlin.
29. Boorman, S. (1975), A combinatorial optimization model for transmission of job infor-
mation through contact networks, Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 1, 216-49.
30. Bourdieu, P. (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge.
31. Bramoulle´, Y. and R. Kranton (2007), Public goods in Networks, Journal of Economic
Theory, 135, 478-494.
32. Bramoulle´, Y. and R. Kranton (2007), Risk-sharing networks, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 64, 34, 275-294.
23
33. Bramoullee´, Y., S. Currarini, M.O. Jackson, P. Pin and B. Rogers (2012), Homophily
and Long-Run Integration in Social Networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 147, 5,
1754–1786.
34. Cabrales, Gottardi and Vega-Redondo (2012), Risk-sharing and contagion in networks.
Working paper. EUI, Florence.
35. Cabrales, A., Calvo-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2011), Social interactions and spillovers,
Games and Economic Behavior, 72, 339-360.
36. Calvo-Armengol, A. (2004), Job Contact Networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 115,
1, 2004, 191206.
37. Calvo-Armengol, A. and M. O. Jackson (2004), The Effects of Social Networks on Em-
ployment and Inequality, American Economic Review, 94, 3, 426-454.
38. Campbell, A (2013), Word-of-Mouth Communication and Percolation in Social Net-
works. American Economic Review, 103, 6, 2466-98.
39. Carvalho, V. (2014), From Micro to Macro via Production Networks. Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 28, 4, 23-48.
40. Coase, R (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4, 16, 386-405.
41. Cohen, L., A. Frazzini, and C. Malloy (2008), The Small World of Investing: Board
Connections and Mutual Fund Returns. Journal of Political Economy, 116, 951-979.
42. Coleman, J. (1966), Medical Innovation: A diffusion study. Bobbs-Merrill. New York.
43. Coleman, J. (1988), Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, American Journal
of Sociology, 94, S95-S120
44. Conley, Timothy G., and Christopher R. Udry (2010), Learning about a New Technol-
ogy: Pineapple in Ghana, American Economic Review, 100, 1: 35-69.
45. Currarini, S., M. O. Jackson, P. Pin (2009), An Economic Model of Friendship: Ho-
mophily, Minorities and Segregation, Econometrica, 77, 4, 1003-1045.
46. Dasgupta, P. and I. Serageldin (1999), Social capital: a multifaceted perspective. World
Bank Publications. Washington D.C.
24
47. DeGroot, M. H., (1974), Reaching a Consensus, Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 69, 345, 118- 121.
48. Doreian, P. and F. Stokman (2001), Evolution of Social Networks, Special Volume:
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 25, 1-10.
49. Durlauf, S. and P. Young (2001), Social Dynamics. Brookings Institute.
50. Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly
Connected World. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
51. Elliott, M. (2014), Inefficiencies in Networked Markets, American Economic Journal:
Micro, forthcoming.
52. Elliott, M., B. Golub and M.O. Jackson (2012), Financial Networks and Contagion.
American Economic Review, 104, 10, 3115-53.
53. Ellison, G., and D. Fudenberg (1993), Rules of Thumb for Social Learning, Journal of
Political Economy, 101, 612-643.
54. Ellison, G., and D. Fudenberg (1995), Word of Mouth Communication and Social Learn-
ing, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 93-126.
55. Evans, G., and S. Honkapohja (2001), Learning and Expectations in Microeconomics
Princeton University Press.
56. Fainmesser, I., and A. Galeotti (2014), The value of network information, Mimeo, Essex
University.
57. Farboodi, M (2014), Intermediation and voluntary exposure to counter-party risk, Work-
ing Paper, University of Chicago.
58. Farrell, F. and G. Saloner (1986), Installed base and compatibility: Innovation, product
preannouncements, and predation American Economic Review, 76, 940-955.
59. Feder, G., Just, R. E. and D. Zilberman (1985), Adoption of Agricultural Innovations
in Developing Countries: A Survey, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 33,
255-298.
25
60. Cohen, L., A. Frazini and C. Malloy (2008), The Small World of Investing: Board
Connections and Mutual Fund Returns, Journal of Political Economy, 116, 5, 951-979.
61. Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine (1998), The Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press.
Cambridge, MA.
62. Fursawa, T. and H. Konishi (2007), Free Trade Networks, Journal of International
Economics, 72, 2, 2007, 310-335.
63. Galeotti, A., and S. Goyal (2009), Influencing the influencers: a theory of strategic
diffusion, Rand Journal of Economics, 40, 3, 509532
64. Galeotti, A. and S. Goyal (2010), The Law of the Few, American Economic Review 100,
1468-1492.
65. Golub, B. and M.O Jackson (2012), How Homophily affects the speed of learning and
best response dynamics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 3, 1287-1338.
66. Golub, B. and M. O. Jackson (2010), Naive Learning and the Wisdom of Crowds,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, 1, 112-149.
67. Goyal, S. (1993), Sustainable communication networks, Tinbergen Institute Discussion
Paper, TI 93-250.
68. Goyal, S. (2007), Connections: an introduction to the economics of networks. Princeton
University Press. Princeton.
69. Goyal, S. (2012), Learning in networks, in Handbook of Social Economics, eds. J. Ben-
Habib, A. Bisin, M.O. Jackson. North Holland.
70. Goyal, S. and S. Joshi (2003), Networks of collaboration in oligopoly, Games and
Economic Behavior, 43, 1, 57-85.
71. Goyal, S. and S. Joshi (2006) Bilateralism and Free Trade, International Economic
Review, 47, 3, 749-778.
72. Goyal, S., and M. Kearns (2012), Competitive Contagion in Networks. Symposium in
theory of computing, (STOC).
26
73. Goyal, S., M. van der Leij and J.L. Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004), Economics: Emerging
Small World, Journal of Political Economy, 114, 403-412.
74. Goyal, S. and J. L. Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), R&D Networks, Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics, 32, 4, 686-707.
75. Goyal, S. and F. Vega-Redondo (2005), Network formation and social coordination,
Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 178-207
76. Goyal, S. and F. Vega-Redondo (2007), Structural holes in social networks, Journal of
Economic Theory, 137, 460-492.
77. Goyal, S. and A. Vigier (2014), Attack, Defence and Contagion in Networks, Review of
Economics Studies, 81, 4, 1518-1542.
78. Galeotti, A., D. Goyal, M. Jackson, F. Vega-Redondo, and L. Yariv (2010), Network
Games, Review of Economic Studies, 77, 1, 218-244.
79. Granovetter, M. (1973), The Strength of Weak Ties, American Journal of Sociology, 78,
1360-1380.
80. Granovetter, M. (1974), Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers, Harvard
University Press. Cambridge. MA.
81. Granovetter, M. (1985), Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Em-
beddedness, American Journal of Sociology, 3, 481-510.
82. Griliches, Z., (1957), Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological
Change, Econometrica, 2, 4, 501-522.
83. Gulati, R. (2007), Managing Network Resources. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
84. Gulati, R., N. Nohria and A. Zaheer (2000), Strategic Networks, Strategic Management
Journal, 21, 203-215.
85. Hagedoorn, J. (2002), Inter-firm R&D partnerships: an overview of major trends and
patterns since 1960, Research Policy, 31, 477-492.
86. Hagerstrand, J. (1967), Innovation diffusion as a spatial process. Translated by A.Pred.
University of Chicago Press. Chicago.
27
87. Hiller, T. (2012), Peer Effects in Endogenous Networks, Working Paper, Bristol Univer-
sity.
88. Hojman, D., and A. Szeidl (2008), Core and periphery in endogenous networks, Journal
of Economic Theory 139, 1, 295-309.
89. Hong, H., J. D. Kubik, and J. C. Stein (2005). Thy Neighbor’s Portfolio: Word-of-
Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers. Journal of Finance 60
2801-2824.
90. Jackson, M. O. (2008), Social and Economic Networks. Princeton University Press.
Princeton.
91. Jackson, M.O. and B. Rogers (2007), Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How
Random Are Social Networks? American Economic Review, 97, 3, 890-915.
92. Jackson, M. O. and A. Wolinsky (1996), A Strategic Model of Economic and Social
Networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 1, 44-74.
93. Jackson, M. O. and Y. Zenou (2014), Games on Networks Handbook of Game Theory,
Vol. 4, edited by Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir.
94. Jhadbabaie, A., P. Molavi, and A-R. Tahbaz-Salehi (2013), Heterogeneity and the Speed
of Learning in Social Networks, Working Paper, Columbia University.
95. Karlan, D., M. Mobius, T. Rosenblat and A. Szeidl (2009), Trust and Social Collateral,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 3, 1307-1361.
96. Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1985), Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility,
American Economic Review, 75, 3, 424-440.
97. Katz, E., and P. F. Lazarsfeld (1955), Personal Influence: The Part Played by People
in the Flow of Mass Communications. The Free Press. New York.
98. Kirman, Alan (1997), The Economy as an Evolving Network, Journal of Evolutionary
Economics, 7, 339-353.
99. Kirman, A., and J-P. Zimmerman (2001), Economics with heterogenous interacting
agents, Springer-Verlag. Berlin.
28
100. Kirman, A., and A. Vignes (1991), Price Dispersion: Theoretical Considerations and
Empirical Evidence from the Marseilles Fish Market, in Kenneth J. Arrow, ed., Issues in
Contemporary Economics: Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of the International
Economic Association, Athens, Greece. Volume 1 : Markets and Welfare. New York
University Press. New York.
101. Kotowoski, M. and M. Leister (2014), Trading networks and equilibrium intermediation,
mimeo University of California, Berkeley.
102. Koenig, M., C. J. Tessone, and Y. Zenou (2014), Nestedness in Networks: A Theoretical
Model and Some Applications, Theoretical Economics, 9, 695-752.
103. Kranton, R. and D. Minehart (2001), A theory of buyer-seller networks, American Eco-
nomic Review, 91, 3, 485-508.
104. Kuhn, T. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago. Chicago.
105. Lazarsfeld, P. F., B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet (1948), The People’s Choice: How the
Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. Columbia University Press. New
York.
106. Lazarsfeld, P. F. and Merton, R. (1954), Friendship as a Social Process: A Substantive
and Methodological Analysis. In Freedom and Control in Modern Society, M. Berger,
T. Abel, and C. H. Page (eds). Van Nostrand. New York.
107. Loury, G. (1977), A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in Women, Mi-
norities, and Employment Discrimination, Edited by P.A. Wallace and A. Le Mund.
Lexington Books. Lexington, MA.
108. Van Lelyveld I., and D. in t’ Veld (2012), Finding the core: Network structure in inter-
bank markets. DNB Working Paper No. 348.
109. Manea, M. (2013), Intermediation in networks, mimeo MIT.
110. McPherson, M., L. Smith-Lovin, J. M Cook (2001), Birds of a feather: Homophily in
social networks, Annual review of sociology, 27, 415-444.
111. Mossel, E. A. Sly and O. Tamuz (2015), Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social
Networks, mimeo MIT.
29
112. Mueller-Frank, M. (2013), A General Framework for Rational Learning in Social Net-
works, Theoretical Economics, 8, 1, 1-40
113. Montgomery, J., (1991), Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Eco-
nomic Analysis, The American Economic Review, 81, 5, 1408-1418.
114. Munshi, K. (2014), Community Networks and the Process of Development, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 28, 4, 49-76.
115. Myerson, R (1991), Game Theory: Analysis of conflict. Harvard University Press.
Cambridge MA.
116. Nava, F., (2014), Efficiency in Decentralized Oligopolistic Markets, mimeo. LSE.
117. Ozsoylev, H., J. Walden, D. Yavuz, and R. Bildick (2014), Investor Networks in the
Stock Market, The Review of Financial Studies, 27, 5, 1323-1366.
118. Ozsoylev, H. and J. Walden (2011), Asset Pricing in Large Information Networks, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 146, 6, 2252-2280.
119. Polanyi, K (1944), The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our
time. Rinehart. New York.
120. Powell, W (1990), Neither market not hierarchy: network forms of organization, Research
in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336.
121. Rogers, E.M. (1983) Diffusion of Innovations, 3rd Edition. Free Press. New York.
122. Ryan, B. and N. Gross (1943), The diffusion of hybrid seed corn in two Iowa communities,
Rural Sociology, 8, 15-24.
123. Rogers, E (1983), Diffusion of Innovations, 3rd Edition. Free Press. New York.
124. Rothschild, M. (1974), A two-armed bandit theory of market pricing, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 9, 2, 185-202.
125. Schelling, T. (1975), Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Norton. New York.
126. Smelser, N. J. and R. Swedberg (2005), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Second
Edition. Russell Sage Foundation.
30
127. Tirole, J (1994), The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press.
128. Uzzi, B. (1996), The sources and consequences of embeddedness: the network effect,
American Sociological Review, 61, 4, 674-698.
129. Westbrock, B (2010), Inter-firm networks: economic and sociological perspectives. Ph.D
Dissertation, Utrecht University.
130. Watts, D. (1999), Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks between Order and Ran-
domness, Princeton University Press. Princeton.
131. Weisbuch, G. , A. Kirman, and D. Herreiner (2000), Market Organisation and Trading
Relationships, Economic Journal, 110, 411-36.
31
